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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1123 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMES WALTER DAVIDSON, Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 95-cr-00495-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Anita B. Brody 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 17, 2012 
 
Before:  AMBRO, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed July 18, 2012) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In 1995, a federal jury found Davidson guilty of possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine base within 1000 feet of a playground in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860.  
In light of his criminal history, he was sentenced as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of 
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the Sentencing Guidelines.  Under that section, his offense level was 34, which was 
higher than his offense level would have been based on his crimes relating to cocaine 
base (“crack cocaine”).  The District Court sentenced him within the guidelines of 262 
months to 327 months to 264 months of imprisonment (plus a fine of $2000, eight years 
of supervised release, and $100 special assessment).  Davidson appealed.  We affirmed 
the District Court’s judgment.  
 In addition to other challenges to the judgment, in 2008, Davidson filed a pro se 
motion for a two-level reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  The 
District Court appointed counsel, who argued that Davidson’s sentence should be reduced 
because of the retroactively applied Amendment 706 (which lowered the base offense 
levels for crack cocaine offenses under § 2D1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines by two 
levels).  The District Court denied Davidson’s motion, citing United States v. Mateo, 560 
F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2009).  In Mateo, we explained that Amendment 706 has no effect on 
the application of the career offender offense level under § 4B1.1, and a career offender 
cannot seek a reduction of sentence under § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 706.  560 
F.3d at 155.  On appeal, Davidson, through counsel, acknowledged that Mateo barred his 
claim but sought to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review.  We excused the 
Government from filing a brief and summarily affirmed the District Court’s decision.   
 In November 2011, Davidson filed another pro se motion for a two-level reduction 
in sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  In his motion, he argued that he was 
entitled to a reduction under part A of retroactively applied Amendment 750, which 
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altered the offense levels in § 2D1.1 relating to crack cocaine.  He also claimed that the 
District Court erred in considering one of his prior convictions (a state conviction for 
possession with intent to deliver heroin) as a predicate offense for his career offender 
designation.  Lastly, he contended that under current law (specifically the Fair Sentencing 
Act of 2010) his crime would be classified differently and his sentencing guideline range 
would change, so he would be entitled to a lower career offender sentence.  Considering 
Mateo and Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2688 (2010), which provided 
guidance to district courts about reductions in sentences based on a retroactively 
applicable Guidelines amendment, the District Court denied Davidson’s motion.   
 Davidson appeals.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review of a district court’s interpretation of the guidelines is plenary, while our review of 
the ultimate decision whether to grant or deny a motion for a sentence reduction under 
§ 3582(c)(2) is for abuse of discretion.  Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154.  On review, we conclude 
that the District Court did not err in denying Davidson’s motion.     
 The District Court followed the procedure outlined in Dillon.  Namely, a court 
must first determine if a sentence reduction is consistent with § 1B1.10 before it 
considers whether an authorized reduction is warranted.  Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2691.  As 
the District Court concluded, a sentence reduction based on Amendment 750 was not 
consistent with the policy of § 1B1.10 because that provision disallows a reduction where 
Amendment 750 “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable 
guideline range.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).  As in Davidson’s earlier attempt to 
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reduce his sentence, the rationale of Mateo bars his claim (including the arguments he 
repeats).  See Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155; see also United States v. Thompson, --- F.3d ---, 
No. 11-4120, 2012 WL 2308099, at *5 (3d Cir. Jun. 19, 2012).  Like Amendment 706, 
Amendment 750 has no effect on his offense level, which was based on his designation as 
a career offender.  Accordingly, it is not a basis for a reduction of sentence under 
§ 3582(c)(2).     
 Furthermore, in his § 3582(c)(2) motion, Davidson could not bring his challenge 
to his classification of a career offender (based on his argument that one of his prior 
convictions did not qualify as a predicate offenses for the career offender designation).  It 
simply is not the type of claim intended to be brought under the statutory provision.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).    
 Also, Davidson was not entitled to a reduction of sentence under § 3582(c)(2) 
based on his argument that his offense level as a career offender was reduced by the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 when it altered the statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses.  
Davidson contends that the statutory penalty for the crime on which the calculation of his 
offense level as a career offender was based has been lowered by the Fair Sentencing Act.  
However, the Fair Sentencing Act’s change to the statutory penalties for crack cocaine 
offenses does not apply retroactively to defendants who committed their crimes and were 
sentenced before its enactment.  See United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 113-15 (3d 
Cir. 2010); see also Dorsey v. United States, No. 11-5683, --- U.S. ---, 2012 WL 
2344463, at *14 (U.S. 2012) (summarizing that the ordinary practice in federal 
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sentencing “is to apply new penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding 
that change from defendants already sentenced”).  Accordingly, any difference in the 
penalty cannot change Davidson’s offense level and cannot serve as a guideline change 
that is a basis for a reduction of his sentence under § 3582(c)(2).           
   For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.     
 
